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Abstract
Weighted voting games are a family of cooperative games, typically used to model voting situations
where a number of agents (players) vote against or for a proposal. In such games, a proposal is accepted if
an appropriately weighted sum of the votes exceeds a prespecified threshold. As the influence of a player
over the voting outcome is not in general proportional to her assigned weight, various power indices have
been proposed to measure each player’s influence. The inverse power index problem is the problem of
designing a weighted voting game that achieves a set of target influences according to a predefined power
index. In this work, we study the computational complexity of the inverse problem when the power index
belongs to the class of semivalues. We prove that the inverse problem is computationally intractable for a
broad family of semivalues, including all regular semivalues. As a special case of our general result, we
establish computational hardness of the inverse problem for the Banzhaf indices and the Shapley values,
arguably the most popular power indices.
∗An extended abstract of this work appears in the Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI 2019).
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Weighted voting games are a classical family of cooperative games that have been extensively studied in the
game theory and social choice literature. Such games model a common voting scenario where each agent
(player), associated with a weight, casts a “YES” (for) or “NO” (against) vote: if the weighted sum of the
“YES” votes exceeds a threshold, then the voting outcome is “YES”, otherwise the outcome is “NO”. Exam-
ples of such practical scenarios include the voting system of the European Union, stockholder companies,
and resource allocation in multi-agent systems [EGGW08, DKKZ14].
Although having a larger weight might help an agent affect the voting outcome, her influence on the
result of the game is not always proportional to her weight. Thus, instead of using agents’ weights, the
power of an agent over the outcome is usually measured in a systematic way by a power index. Over the
years, many power indices have been proposed and studied, such as the Shapley value [Sha53] (also known
as Shapley-Shubik index for weighted voting games [SS54]), the Banzhaf index [BI64], the Deegan-Packel
index [DP78], and the Holler index [Hol82]. The problem of computing the agents’ power indices in a given
game has received ample attention and its computational complexity is well-understood for many game
representations and power index functions (see, e.g., [PK90, DP94, Azi08]).
1.2 Our Contributions
In this work, we focus on the inverse power index problem — that is, the problem of designing a weighted
voting game with a given set of power indices. As we will explain in detail below, the inverse problem
has been extensively studied in various fields, including game theory, social choice theory, and learning
theory. Various works have provided heuristic methods, exponential time algorithms, or polynomial time
approximation algorithms with provable performance guarantees for this problem.
Despite this wealth of prior work on the algorithmic version of the inverse problem, prior to this work
its computational complexity was not well-understood, even for the most popular power indices (Shapley
values, Banzhaf indices). In this paper, we study and essentially resolve the computational complexity of
the inverse power index problem for weighted voting games, with respect to a broad and extensively studied
family of power indices. Specifically, we show that the inverse problem is computationally intractable under
standard complexity assumptions. More specifically, we prove that for a large class of power indices —
that includes the popular Banzhaf index, Shapley values, and the class of semivalues [Web79] — the inverse
problem cannot be in the polynomial hierarchy (PH), unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. Prior to this
work, it was conceivable that there exists an exact polynomial time algorithm for this problem. It follows
from our hardness result that the existence of such an algorithm is unlikely.
1.3 Related work
Several heuristic algorithms for the inverse Banzhaf index problem have been proposed in the social choice
and game theory literature. Aziz, Paterson, and Leech [APL07] give an approximation algorithm that on
input target Banzhaf indices and a desired ℓ2-distance bound outputs a weighted voting game with integer
weights that has Banzhaf indices within the desired distance bound. Unfortunately, no theoretical guaran-
tees are provided regarding the convergence rate of this method, and it is not known whether it converges
to an approximately optimal solution. Two related heuristic algorithms that return weighted voting games
with Banzhaf indices within a given distance from the target indices are proposed by Laruelle and Wid-
gren [LW98] and Leech [Lee03]. Similarly to [APL07], Fatima, Wooldridge, and Jennings [FWJ08] give an
iterative approximation algorithm for the inverse Shapley value problem that on input target Shapley values,
a quota, and a desired average percentage difference, outputs a weighted voting game with the given quota
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that has Shapley values within the desired distance. It is shown that each iteration runs in quadratic time and
that the algorithm eventually converges, but no theoretical guarantees are given regarding the convergence
rate, i.e., the time until a desired approximation is achieved.
An exact algorithm for both the inverse Banzhaf index and inverse Shapley value problems is given by
Kurz [Kur12]. The proposed method relies on integer linear programming and returns a weighted voting
game that minimizes the ℓ1-distance from the target power indices. This method has running time exponen-
tial in the number of players. Another exact, but exponential-time, algorithm for the inverse power index
problem is given by De Keijzer, Klos, and Zhang [DKKZ14]. The [DKKZ14] algorithm outputs a weighted
voting game in which the power indices of the players are as close to the target vector as possible. The pre-
sented algorithm is based on an enumeration of all weighted voting games: for each weighted voting game,
the algorithm computes the power indices, their distance from the target ones and it then outputs the game
with the smallest distance. Since there exist 2Ω(n
2) weighted voting games with n players, this algorithm
also runs in exponential time.
In addition to the several heuristics and exponential time algorithms that have been proposed, a line
of recent works in theoretical computer science [OS11, DDFS14, DDS17] have obtained polynomial time
approximation algorithms with provable performance guarantees for the inverse problem with respect to both
the Banzhaf indices and the Shapley values. These algorithms output a weighted voting game whose power
indices have small ℓ2-distance from the target indices. These algorithmic results were recently extended to
more general classes of functions [DK18].
The inverse power index problem is also of significant interest in various other fields, such as circuit
complexity and computational learning theory. The reader is referred to [OS11] for a detailed summary of
this connection. In the fields of computational complexity and learning theory, linear threshold functions
(LTFs), which are equivalent to weighted voting games if we allow negative weights [DKKZ14], have been
of great significance and have been studied for several decades [Ros58, Cho61, MTT61b, Der65, MP68]. A
fundamental result of C. K. Chow from the the early 1960s [Cho61] shows that linear threshold functions
are characterized by their degree-0 and degree-1 “Fourier coefficients”, now known as Chow parameters.
Given this structural result, the following natural computational question — now known as “the Chow
parameters problem” [OS11] — arises: Given the Chow parameters of an LTF, reconstruct a weights-based
representation of the function. Interestingly, the Chow parameters are essentially equivalent to the non-
normalized Banzhaf indices [DS79], and therefore the inverse Banzhaf index problem is tantamount to the
Chow parameters problem.
In addition to the aforementioned algorithmic results, a number of complexity results have been estab-
lished concerning weighted voting games. Aziz [Azi08], Elkind et al. [EGGW09], and Elkind et al. [EGGW08]
study the computational complexity of various problems related to weighted voting games. Aziz [Azi08]
studies the complexity of computing various indices such as the Shapley values, the Banzhaf, and the
Deegan-Packel indices for a given simple game when the game is given in different forms. Finally, Fal-
iszewski and Hemaspaandra [FH08] study the complexity of the power index comparison problem: given
two weighted voting games and a player, decide on which game the given player has higher influence as
it is computed by a specific power index. They show that this problem is intractable, namely PP-complete,
for both the Shapley values and Banzhaf index. To achieve this, they extend the #P-metric-completeness
of computing the Shapley values, proved by Deng and Papadimitriou [DP94]. They prove that, whereas
computing the Banzhaf indices of a weighted voting game is #P-parsimonious-complete [PK90], computing
the Shapley values is #P-many-one complete and it cannot be strengthened to #P-parsimonious-complete.
Gopalan, Nisan, and Roughgarden [GNR15] study the convex polytope consisting of the Chow parameters
of all Boolean functions. They show that the linear optimization problem over this polytope is #P-hard; a
result that indicates, but does not logically imply, that the inverse Banzhaf index problem may be intractable.
2
2 Preliminaries
Notation We write wt(x) to denote the weight of a Boolean vector x ∈ {−1, 1}n, i.e., the number of 1’s
in x. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and x ∈ {−1, 1}n such that xi = −1, we write x
i to denote the vector obtained
when we flip the ith coordinate of x. We denote by 1 (resp. -1) the vector in {−1, 1}n with all coordinates
equal to 1 (resp. −1). We will denote by Conv(S) the convex hull of the set S. We will use sign : R → R
for the function that takes value 1 if z ≥ 0 and value −1 if z < 0.
Our basic object of study is the family of linear threshold functions (LTFs) over {−1, 1}n:
Definition 1 (Linear Threshold Function). A linear threshold function (LTF) is any function fw,θ : {−1, 1}
n →
{−1, 1} such that fw,θ(x) = sign(w · x− θ) for some weight vector w ∈ R
n and threshold θ ∈ R.
Note that weighted voting games are equivalent to LTFs with non-negative weights. We leverage this
equivalence throughout this paper. At various points, we may refer to a weighted voting game as an LTF
without further elaboration.
Semivalues We mainly focus on power indices that belong to the class of semivalues. Semivalues are
a fundamental family of power indices, introduced by Weber [Web79] as generalizations of the Shapley
value that do not satisfy the efficiency axiom [DNW81]. Since their introduction, semivalues have received
considerable attention, see, e.g., [Ein87, CFP03, CF08].
We start by providing the definition of semivalues [SR88] in terms of weighting coefficients, as they
were characterized by Dubey, Neyman, and Weber [DNW81]:
Definition 2 (Semivalues). For a positive integer n, a probability vector pn = (pn0 , . . . , p
n
n−1) ∈ R
n is a
vector such that
∑n−1
t=0
(
n−1
t
)
pnt = 1 and p
n
t ≥ 0, for t ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. The i-th semivalue corresponding
to the probability vector pn of a Boolean function f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} is defined to be
f˜p
n
(i) =
∑
x∈{−1,1}n:xi=−1
pnwt(x)f(x)xi +
∑
x∈{−1,1}n:xi=1
pnwt(x)−1f(x)xi ,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Intuitively, we can interpret pn as the vector of probabilities that a given player will join a coalition of
size t [CF08], 0 ≤ t ≤ n − 1. With this interpretation, the i-th semivalue computes the probability of the
event that player i is a pivot, i.e., the probability that the output of the game would change from 1 to −1 if
the i-th player (the i-th variable) were to change her vote from 1 to −1.
We call a semivalue regular if it is defined by strictly positive probability vectors [CF08].
Remark The Shapley values and Banzhaf indices are the semivalues defined by pnt =
(n−t−1)!t!
n! [SS54]
and pnt =
1
2n−1
[DS79], respectively. Note that both indices are regular semivalues.
Reformulation of Semivalues The following equivalent way to express a set of semivalues will be useful
throughout this paper. Setting pn−1 = p
n
n = 0, we observe that we can rewrite the semivalues vector defined
by the probability vector pn as follows. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have:
f˜p
n
(i) =
1
2
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
f(x)xi
(
pnwt(x) + p
n
wt(x)−1
)
+
1
2
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
f(x)
(
pnwt(x)−1 − p
n
wt(x)
)
. (1)
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From this representation, a probability distribution µpn over {−1, 1}
n emerges, defined as follows. For
x ∈ {−1, 1}n, we have:
µpn(x) :=
µ′pn(x)
Λ(pn)
,
where µ′pn(x) := p
n
wt(x) + p
n
wt(x)−1 and Λ(p
n) :=
∑
x∈{−1,1}n µ
′
pn(x) is the normalizing factor.
For a Boolean function f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, we will write f̂p
n
(i) :=
∑
x∈{−1,1}n µ
′
pn(x)f(x)xi
for the first term of (1) and Cp
n
f :=
∑
x∈{−1,1}n f(x)(p
n
wt(x)−1 − p
n
wt(x)) for the second term of (1). One
can view the first term, f̂p
n
(i), as the expectation Ex∼µpn [f(x)xi] (up to the normalizing factor Λ(p
n)).
We now define the notion of a reasonable probability vector to describe the family of semivalues for
which our computational hardness results apply:
Definition 3 (Reasonable Probability Vector). A probability vector pn ∈ Rn is called reasonable if there
exists a t with t = Ω(n) and n− t = Ω(n) such that pnt > 0.
The intuition behind the above definition is that the distribution µpn has support 2
Ω(n). Note that this
happens when there exists a t with
(
n
t
)
= 2Ω(n) such that pnt > 0. We recall that all regular semivalues
(including the Banzhaf indices and Shapley values) satisfy this property.
Remark 1. For computational purposes, throughout this paper, we will assume that each value pnt defining
our probability vector is a rational number that can be described as a ratio of integers with poly(n) bits.
Inverse Semivalues Problem We are ready to define the inverse semivalues problem. Let n denote the
number of players and consider the semivalues defined by a known probability vector pn. Given a vector
c = (c1, . . . , cn) of target semivalues, we want to either find a weighted voting game with these target
semivalues or decide that there does not exist any weighted voting game with semivalues vector c.
Name: SVpn-Inverse Problem
Input: A vector (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Q
n and θ ∈ Q.
Question: Output w ∈ Qn+ with
∑n
i=1 wi = 1 such that f˜
pn
w,θ(i) = ci, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, or “NO”
if no such w exists.
3 Main Result: Computational Intractability of Inverse Power-Index Prob-
lem
3.1 Statement of Main Result and Proof Overview
The main result of this paper is the following:
Theorem 1 (Main Result, Informal Statement). For semivalues defined by the probability vector pn, if pn
is a reasonable probability vector, then the SVpn-Inverse problem is not in the polynomial hierarchy, unless
the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 1, we obtain that the inverse power index problem is similarly
intractable for the class of regular semivalues, which includes the Shapley values and the Banzhaf indices.
4
Proof Overview We start with a brief overview of our proof establishing Theorem 1. To prove hardness
of the inverse problem, we examine the convex polytope Cpn+2 consisting of the convex combinations of the
semivalues of linear threshold functions with zero threshold and weight vectors of a specific form described
below (Definition 4). We prove (Theorem 2) that if the probability vector pn defining the semivalues is rea-
sonable, then the linear optimization over Cpn+2 is #P-hard (under Turing reductions). Then, we proceed to
show (Theorem 4) that the optimization problem can be solved using an oracle for the semivalues verifi-
cation problem, i.e., the problem of verifying that the given target semivalues are the actual semivalues of
a given linear threshold function, or an oracle for the inverse problem for weight vectors of the aforemen-
tioned specific form. We thus conclude that the verification and the inverse semivalues problem for linear
threshold functions with this specific weight structure cannot be in the polynomial hierarchy. Finally, using a
lemma that shows that semivalues characterize the space of linear threshold functions with the same thresh-
old (Lemma 3), we show hardness of the inverse and verification problems for linear threshold functions
with positive weights, i.e., for weighted voting games, as desired.
Our proof strategy bears some similarities to the approach by Gopalan, Nisan, and Roughgarden [GNR15]
(also exploited by Dughmi and Xu [DX16]). In particular, Gopalan, Nisan, and Roughgarden [GNR15] show
that the linear optimization problem over the polytope consisting of the Chow parameters of all Boolean
functions is #P-complete, and therefore there cannot exist an efficient membership oracle for this polytope.
We note that our results include the results of [GNR15] regarding Chow parameters as a very special case:
as previously mentioned, the non-normalized Banzhaf indices of a linear threshold function are equal to its
Chow parameters and they are semivalues.
Despite this similarity, our proof involves a number of novel ideas that seem necessary in order to handle
a broad range of probability distributions that could define a semivalue. One of the difficulties comes from
the fact that we want to prove hardness for the class of weighted voting games, i.e., LTFs with positive
weights. While this requirement is easy to handle for the Banzhaf indices (Chow parameters), it poses non-
trivial difficulties for more general semivalues. To handle this, we propose a generalization of the definition
of the Khintchine constant from the uniform distribution to any probability distribution and establish that it
is hard to compute under a restricted set of weights that is crucial for our proof (Theorem 3). Another crucial
ingredient of our proof is a new structural result (Lemma 3) establishing that the set of semivalues uniquely
determines a weighted voting game.
3.2 Proof of Main Result
In this subsection, we proceed with the detailed proof of Theorem 1.
Semivalues Polytope Our analysis makes essential use of the convex polytope defined as the convex
hull of the set of semivalues for all linear threshold functions whose weights-based representation is of a
specific form: Namely, their threshold θ = 0 and their weight vectors consist of n positive coordinates and
two coordinates each of whose weights is equal to minus a half times the sum of the first n coordinates.
Formally, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 4. For a positive integer n, define Cpn+2 := Conv(Apn+2), where
Apn+2 :=
{
c ∈ Rn+2 : ∃w ∈ Rn+2, wi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, wn+1 = wn+2 = −
n∑
i=1
wi/2, ci = f˜
pn+2
w,0 (i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 2
}
.
The first main step of our proof involves showing that the linear optimization problem over the above
defined polytope is computationally hard.
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Linear Optimization over Cpn+2 We firstly prove that if the semivalues’ probability distribution defined
by pn+2 has a sufficiently large support (in particular, if pn+2 is a reasonable vector as in Definition 3), then
the linear optimization problem over the polytope Cpn+2 is #P-hard.
The linear optimization problem for semivalues defined by any probability vector pn+2 is captured by
the following family of problems:
Name: SVpn+2-Optimization Problem
Input: A vector a = (a1, . . . , an+2) ∈ Q
n+2.
Question: Compute maxc∈C
pn+2
a · c.
The main result of this subsection is the following:
Theorem 2. If pn+2 is a reasonable probability vector, the SVpn+2-Optimization Problem is #P-hard.
We prove Theorem 2 by reducing from an intermediate problem — that of computing the Khintchine
constant of a vector with respect to the probability distribution µpn :
Name: Khintchineµpn
Input: A vector a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Q
n.
Question: Compute Kµpn (a) = Ex∼µpn [|a · x|].
The Khintchine constant has been extensively studied with respect to the uniform distribution on the
Boolean hypercube (see, e.g., [Sza76, DDS16] and references therein). We note that [GNR15] established
the intractability of computing this quantity under the uniform distribution. We show:
Theorem 3. If pn+2 is a reasonable probability vector, the Khintchineµ
pn+2
problem is #P-hard, even re-
stricted to inputs (a1, . . . , an,−A/2,−A/2), where A =
∑n
i=1 ai and ai > 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. We start by showing that the #Partition problem for the distribution µpn is hard and then reduce the
latter problem to the former.
Name: #Partitionµpn
Input: A vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Z
n.
Question: Compute Prx∼µpn [w · x = 0].
We start with the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If pn+2 is a reasonable probability vector, #Partitionµ
pn+2
is #P-hard, even restricted to
inputs (w1, . . . , wn,−W/2,−W/2), whereW =
∑n
i=1wi and wi > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. We reduce from the following problem:
Name: #R-Partition
Input: Positive integers cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n and a positive integer b1n ≤ k ≤ b2n, where 0 < b1 ≤ b2 < 1, such
that if there is a subset S of {1, . . . , n} with
∑
i∈S ci =
∑n
i=1 ci/2, then |S|= k or |S|= n− k.
Question: Compute the number of subsets S of {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈S ci =
∑n
i=1 ci/2.
Given an instance c1, . . . , cn of the #P-complete #R-Partition [DP94], we construct an instance of
#Partitionµ
pn+2
as follows: We set wi = ci, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and define w = (w1, . . . , wn,−W/2,−W/2),
whereW =
∑n
i=1 wi. We have:
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Prx∼µ
pn+2
[w · x = 0] =
∑
x∈{−1,1}n+2:w·x=0
µpn+2(x) =
|{x : w · x = 0, x 6∈ {-1, 1}}|
2Λ(pn+2)
(pn+2n−k+1 + p
n+2
n−k)
+
|{x : w · x = 0, x 6∈ {-1, 1}}|
2Λ(pn+2)
(pn+2k+1 + p
n+2
k ) +
1
Λ(pn+2)
(pn+2n+1 + p
n+2
0 ) ,
as the #R-Partition problem guarantees that every solution has size k or n − k and the number of solutions
with size k are equal to the number of solutions with size n − k. That is, every x ∈ {−1, 1}n+2 \ {-1, 1}
such that w · x = 0 is guaranteed to have weight k+ 1 or weight n− k + 1 as xn+1 has to be different than
xn+2, otherwise the only solutions are {-1, 1}. So, for every solution of the #R-partition problem we have
two x ∈ {−1, 1}n+2 \ {1, -1} such that w · x = 0. Thus,∣∣∣∣∣
{
S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} :
∑
i∈S
ci =
n∑
i=1
ci/2
}∣∣∣∣∣ = Λ(p
n+2)Prx∼µ
pn+2
[w · x = 0]− (pn+2n+1 + p
n+2
0 )
(pn+2n−k+1 + p
n+2
n−k + p
n+2
k+1 + p
n+2
k )
.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Given an instance of #Partitionµ
pn+2
, i.e., a = (a1, . . . , an,−A/2,−A/2), where A =
∑n
i=1 ai and
ai > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we construct the following three Khintchineµ
pn+2
instances:
c = 2(a1, a2, . . . , an,−A/2,−A/2),
d = (a1 − y, a2, . . . , an,−A/2 + y/2,−A/2 + y/2),
e = (a1 + y, a2, . . . , an,−A/2 − y/2,−A/2 − y/2),
where 0 < y < 1/2 < a1. We will show that solving the above instances of Khintchineµ
pn+2
suffices to
solve our given instance of #Partitionµ
pn+2
. This will complete the proof of Theorem 3. To do so, we require
some case analysis and explicit calculations.
For any x ∈ {−1, 1}n+2, we have that:
|d · x|=

|
∑n
i=1 aixi +A− 2y|, if x1 = 1, xn+1 = xn+2 = −1
|
∑n
i=1 aixi +A|, if x1 = −1, xn+1 = xn+2 = −1
|
∑n
i=1 aixi −A|, if x1 = 1, xn+1 = xn+2 = 1
|
∑n
i=1 aixi −A+ 2y|, if x1 = −1, xn+1 = xn+2 = 1
|
∑n
i=1 aixi − y|, if x1 = 1, xn+1 6= xn+2
|
∑n
i=1 aixi + y|, if x1 = −1, xn+1 6= xn+2
and similarly
|e · x|=

|
∑n
i=1 aixi +A+ 2y|, if x1 = 1, xn+1 = xn+2 = −1
|
∑n
i=1 aixi +A|, if x1 = −1, xn+1 = xn+2 = −1
|
∑n
i=1 aixi −A|, if x1 = 1, xn+1 = xn+2 = 1
|
∑n
i=1 aixi −A− 2y|, if x1 = −1, xn+1 = xn+2 = 1
|
∑n
i=1 aixi + y|, if x1 = 1, xn+1 6= xn+2
|
∑n
i=1 aixi − y|, if x1 = −1, xn+1 6= xn+2
Given the above, we observe that the following hold:
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• For x ∈ {−1, 1}n+2, wt(x) ∈ {0, n + 2},
|c · x|= |e · x|= |d · x|= 0 .
• For x ∈ {−1, 1}n+2, xn+1 = xn+2 = x1,
|d · x|+|e · x|= |c · x| .
• For x ∈ {−1, 1}n+2, xn+1 6= xn+2:
– If c · x 6= 0,
|d · x|+|e · x|= |c · x| ,
as it holds that |
∑n
i=1 aixi−y|+|
∑n
i=1 aixi+y|= 2max(|
∑n
i=1 aixi|, |y|) and |
∑n
i=1 aixi|≥ 1.
– If c · x = 0, then
|d · x|+|e · x|= 2y .
• For x ∈ {−1, 1}n+2, xn+1 = xn+2, x1 6= xn+1
|d · x|+|e · x|= |c · x| ,
as similarly with the above case, we have that |
∑n+2
i=1 aixi−2y|+|
∑n+2
i=1 aixi+2y|= 2max(|
∑n+2
i=1 aixi|, |2y|)
and |
∑n+2
i=1 aixi|≥ 1.
Hence, we have:
Kµ
pn+2
(d) +Kµ
pn+2
(e)−Kµ
pn+2
(c) = Ex∼µ
pn+2
[|d · x|] + Ex∼µ
pn+2
[|e · x|]− Ex∼µ
pn+2
[|c · x|]
=
∑
x∈{−1,1}n+2
2y · µpn+2(x) · 1c·x=0,x 6∈{−1,1} .
So, we get:
Prx∼µ
pn+2
[a · x = 0] =
Kµ
pn+2
(d) +Kµ
pn+2
(e)−Kµ
pn+2
(c)
2y
+ Prx∼µ
pn+2
[x = -1] + Prx∼µ
pn+2
[x = 1]
=
Kµ
pn+2
(d) +Kµ
pn+2
(e)−Kµ
pn+2
(c)
2y
+
p0 + pn+1
Λ(pn+2)
.
The proof of Theorem 3 is now complete.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. We reduce from the Khintchineµ
pn+2
problem: given the vector a = (a1, . . . , an, an+1 =
−A/2, an+2 = −A/2) ∈ Q
n+2, where A =
∑n
i=1 ai and ai > 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we want to compute
maxc∈C
pn+2
a · c. For any c ∈ Cpn+2 , using our reformulation of semivalues (1), we have:
a · c =
1
2
n+2∑
i=1
aif̂
pn+2(i) +
1
2
n+2∑
i=1
aiC
pn+2
f
=
Λ(pn+2)
2
∑
x∈{−1,1}n+2
f(x)µpn+2(x)
n+2∑
i=1
aixi
≤
Λ(pn+2)
2
∑
x∈{−1,1}n+2
µpn+2(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
n+2∑
i=1
aixi
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
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where f is a linear threshold function.
Reducing from a weight vector that has the sum of its coordinates equal to zero was essential for this
step: the term Cp
n+2
f vanishes and we end up with the term
∑
x∈{−1,1}n+2 f(x)µpn+2(x)
∑n+2
i=1 aixi that is
upper bounded by
∑
x∈{−1,1}n+2 µpn+2(x)|
∑n+2
i=1 aixi|.
This upper bound is tight, as we show below, which is crucial for our argument. If one were to reduce
from a vector with sum different than 0 or include in the polytope only linear threshold functions with
positive weights, it would not have been possible to obtain a tight upper bound.
Observe that
a · c =
Λ(pn+2)
2
∑
x∈{−1,1}n+2
µpn+2(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
n+2∑
i=1
aixi
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
for c = (f˜p
n+2
(1), . . . , f˜p
n+2
(n+ 2)), where f(x) = sign(
∑n+2
i=1 aixi). So,
Ex∼µ
pn+2
[∣∣∣∣∣
n+2∑
i=1
aixi
∣∣∣∣∣
]
=
2maxc∈C
pn+2
a · c
Λ(pn+2)
.
That is, a solution to our instance of linear optimization over our polytope gives a solution to the initial
instance of the Khintchineµ
pn+2
problem, and the proof of Theorem 2 is complete.
Linear Optimization Using a Verification Oracle We prove that the restricted verification problem,
defined below, is computationally hard, where the input linear threshold functions are defined by weight
vectors of the specific form described in Definition 4.
Name: SVRpn+2-Verification Problem
Input: A vector (c1, . . . , cn+2) ∈ Q
n+2 and a vector w = (w1, . . . , wn+2) ∈ Q
n+2 such that
wn+1 = wn+2 = −
∑n
i=1 wi/2 and wi > 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Question: Does it hold that f˜p
n+2
w,0 (i) = ci for i ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 2}?
Theorem 4. If pn+2 is a reasonable probability vector, the SVRpn+2-Verification problem is not in the k-th
level of the polynomial hierarchy, unless #P is contained in the (k + 2)-level.
The main idea behind the proof is that one can solve the linear optimization problem using a membership
oracle of the polytope which can be obtained if we have an efficient algorithm for the restricted verification
problem. Since the vertices of the polytope correspond to semivalues of linear threshold functions, if we
have an efficient algorithm for the verification problem, then we can efficiently verify that a vector is a
vertex of the polytope, and. using Caratheodory’s theorem, we can get a membership oracle. In this way,
we obtain a contradiction, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses: if the verification problem is in the
polynomial hierarchy, then a #P-hard problem lies in the polynomial hierarchy.
The restricted membership problem for any probability vector pn+2 is defined below:
Name: SVRpn+2-Membership Problem
Input: A vector c = (c1, . . . , cn+2) ∈ Q
n+2.
Question: Is c in Cpn+2 ?
Proof of Theorem 4. We first prove the following lemma that shows how an efficient oracle for the restricted
verification problem can be used to obtain a membership oracle:
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Lemma 1. If the SVRpn+2-Verification problem is in the k-th level of PH, then the SVRpn+2-Membership
problem is in the (k + 1)-level.
Proof. Assume that the SVRpn+2-Verification problem is in the k-th level of PH. By Caratheodory’s theorem
a point c is in Cpn+2 iff it is a convex combination of at most n+ 3 vertices of Cpn+2 , i.e., c =
∑m
i=1 λix
(i),
where x(i) is a vertex, λi ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m ≤ n+ 3, and
∑m
i=1 λi = 1. So, it can be certified that a given
point c is in Cpn+2 by finding the m ≤ n + 3 vertices x
(i) and computing the m scaling factors λi. Given
the x(i), one can verify that x(i) is a vertex of Cpn+2 by finding a weight vector w
(i) of the form described
in Definition 4 such that x(i) is the f˜p
n+2
w(i),0
vector, as the vertices of Cpn+2 correspond to linear threshold
functions with weights of this specific form. So, if we are given the x(i) and the corresponding w(i), we
can verify in polynomial time with a k-th level oracle that x(i) is the f˜p
n+2
w(i),0
vector as we assumed that the
SVRn+2p -Verification problem is in the k-th level of PH. Thus, there is a polynomial-size certificate that can
be checked in polynomial time with a k-th level oracle when c is in Cpn+2: the m ≤ n + 3 vertices x
(i),
where each x(i) can be represented by poly(n) bits by assumption; and the m corresponding w(i) vectors,
where each w(i) can be represented by poly(n) bits, as every linear threshold function can be represented
with weight w = (w1, . . . , wn+2) such that each wi is an integer that satisfies |wi|≤ 2
(O(n logn)) [MTT61a].
Given the x(i) and the w(i), it can be verified in polynomial time with a k-th level oracle that the x(i)
are vertices and then we can compute in polynomial time the λi coefficients by solving the linear system
c =
∑m
i=1 λix
(i). Thus, if the SVRpn+2-Verification problem is in the k-th level of PH, the SVRpn+2-
Membership problem is in the (k + 1)-level.
As Cpn+2 has non-empty interior, if the SVRpn+2-Membership problem is in the (k + 1)-level of PH,
then using the ellipsoid algorithm, we could solve the optimization problem using a polynomial number of
membership-oracle calls (page 189, [Sch98]). Hence, we would have that the SVpn+2-Optimization problem,
which by Theorem 2 is #P-hard, is in the (k + 2)-level of PH. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Hardness of the Verification Problem for Weighted Voting Games One important issue is that the
computational problems we have considered so far involve linear threshold functions some of whose weights
can be negative. This seemed necessary to some extent for our arguments, as it is crucially exploited in the
proof of Theorem 2.
We now show how to switch to weighted voting games (i.e., LTFs with non-negative weights), which
was our initial goal. Using a bijection between the semivalues of a linear threshold function with weight
vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) of the form described in Definition 4 and a linear threshold function with weight
vector w′ = (|w1|, . . . , |wn|), we show the equivalence between the restricted verification problem and the
verification problem for linear threshold functions defined by positive weights.
Name: SVpn-Verification Problem
Input: A vector (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Q
n, a vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Q
n
+ and θ ∈ Q.
Question: Does it hold that f˜p
n
w,θ(i) = ci for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}?
Theorem 5. If the SVpn+2-Verification problem is in the k-th level of PH, then the SVRpn+2-Verification
problem is in the k-th level of PH.
Proof. We use the following lemma that shows how one can compute the semivalues of a linear threshold
function with weight vector w of the form described in Definition 4 given the semivalues of the linear
threshold function with weight vector the absolute values of w, and vice-versa.
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Lemma 2. For a positive integer n, fix ai > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and A =
∑n
i=1 ai. Consider the LTFs f(x) =
sign(
∑n
i=1 aixi − (A/2)xn+1 − (A/2)xn+2) and g(x) = sign(
∑n
i=1 aixi + (A/2)xn+1 + (A/2)xn+2).
Then, we have the following:
(i) For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds g˜p
n+2
(i) = f˜p
n+2
(i)− 2(pn+2n+1 − p
n+2
n−1), and
(ii) For n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 2, it holds g˜p
n+2
(i) = f˜p
n+2
(i) + 2
∑n−1
t=0
(
n
t
)
(pn+2t + p
n+2
t+1 ).
Proof. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, from the definitions of semivalues and functions f , g we get:
g˜p
n+2
(i) =
∑
x:xi=−1
pn+2
wt(x)(g(x
i)− g(x))
=
∑
x:xi=−1,
xn+1=xn+2=−1
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj + ai −A
− sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj − ai −A

+
∑
x:xi=−1,
xn+1=xn+2=1
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj + ai +A
− sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj − ai +A

+
∑
x:xi=−1,
xn+1 6=xn+2
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj + ai
− sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj − ai

and
f˜p
n+2
(i) =
∑
x:xi=−1
pn+2
wt(x)(f(x
i)− f(x))
=
∑
x:xi=−1,
xn+1=xn+2=1
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj + ai −A
− sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj − ai −A

+
∑
x:xi=−1,
xn+1=xn+2=−1
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj + ai +A
− sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj − ai +A

+
∑
x:xi=−1,
xn+1 6=xn+2
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj + ai
− sign
 ∑
j≤n:j 6=i
ajxj − ai
 .
As f(x) = −1 for any x 6= 1 with xn+1 = xn+2 = 1, f(x) = 1 for any x with xn+1 = xn+2 = −1,
g(x) = 1 for any x with xn+1 = xn+2 = 1, and g(x) = −1 for any x 6= (1, . . . , 1,−1,−1) with
xn+1 = xn+2 = −1, we get that
f˜p
n+2
(i)− g˜p
n+2
(i) = 2(pn+2n+1 − p
n+2
n−1) .
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For i = n+ 1, we can write:
g˜p
n+2
(n+ 1) =
∑
x:xn+1=−1
pn+2
wt(x)(g(x
n+1)− g(x))
=
∑
x:xn+1=−1,
xn+2=−1
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj
− sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj −A

+
∑
x:xn+1=−1,
xn+2=1
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj +A
− sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj
 .
and
f˜p
n+2
(n + 1) =
∑
x:xn+1=−1
pn+2
wt(x)(f(x
n+1)− f(x))
=
∑
x:xn+1=−1,
xn+2=1
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj −A
− sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj

+
∑
x:xn+1=−1,
xn+2=−1
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj
− sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj +A
 .
We thus have
f˜p
n+2
(n+ 1)− g˜p
n+2
(n+ 1) =
∑
x:xn+1=−1,
xn+2=−1
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj −A
− sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj +A

+
∑
x:xn+1=−1,
xn+2=1
pn+2
wt(x)
sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj −A
− sign
∑
j≤n
ajxj +A

= −2
n−1∑
t=0
(
n
t
)
(pn+2t + p
n+2
t+1 ) .
In the same way, we get that
f˜p
n+2
(n+ 2)− g˜p
n+2
(n+ 2) = −2
n−1∑
t=0
(
n
t
)
(pn+2t + p
n+2
t+1 ) .
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Given an instance (a1, . . . , an,−A/2,−A/2), (c1, . . . , cn+2) of the SVRpn+2-Verification problem, we
construct the following instance of SVpn+2-Verification problem: (a1, . . . , an,+A/2,+A/2), θ = 0,(
c1 − 2(p
n+2
n+1 − p
n+2
n−1), . . . , cn − 2(p
n+2
n+1 − p
n+2
n−1), cn+1 + 2
n−1∑
t=0
(
n
t
)
(pn+2t + p
n+2
t+1 ),
cn+2 + 2
n−1∑
t=0
(
n
t
)
(pn+2t + p
n+2
t+1 )
)
.
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By Lemma 2, we have that the SVRpn+2-Verification instance is a “YES”-instance iff the SVpn+2-Verification
instance is a “YES”-instance. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
Verification Using Inverse Oracle The final step of our proof is to show that the inverse problem for
semivalues is at least as hard as the verification problem. While this is intuitively obvious, the proof requires
the following non-trivial structural result: The semivalues of a weighted voting game characterize the game
within the space of weighted voting games.
Theorem 6. If the SVpn-Inverse problem is in the k-th level of PH, then the SVpn-Verification problem is in
the (k + 1)-level.
Proof. The proof makes essential use of the following lemma that shows that if two LTFs with normalized
weights and the same threshold have the same semivalues, then they are equal on all points x that are
given positive probability by the distribution µ′pn . This lemma is qualitatively similar to (and inspired by)
Chow’s Theorem [Cho61], that shows that a linear threshold function is uniquely determined by its Chow
parameters:
Lemma 3. Let f(x) = sign(w · x − θ) and g(x) = sign(v · x − θ) where
∑n
i=1 wi =
∑n
i=1 vi. If
f˜p
n
(i) = g˜p
n
(i) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then f(x) = g(x) for all x ∈ {−1, 1}n such that pn
wt(x)+ p
n
wt(x)−1 6= 0
and |w · x− θ|+|v · x− θ|6= 0.
Proof. By our assumption that f˜p
n
(i) = g˜p
n
(i) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} it follows that:
2
n∑
i=1
wi(f˜
pn(i)− g˜p
n
(i)) + 2
n∑
i=1
vi(g˜
pn(i)− f˜p
n
(i)) − θ
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
(f(x)− g(x))µ′pn(x)
− θ
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
(g(x) − f(x))µ′pn(x) = 0
Recalling our reformulation of the semivalues (1), we equivalently have:
n∑
i=1
wi
(
f̂p
n
(i)− ĝp
n
(i) + Cp
n
f − C
pn
g
)
+
n∑
i=1
vi
(
ĝp
n
(i) − f̂p
n
(i) + Cp
n
g − C
pn
f
)
− θ
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
(f(x)− g(x))µ′pn(x)− θ
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
(g(x) − f(x))µ′pn(x) = 0
⇔
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
(f(x)− g(x))µ′pn(x)(w · x) +
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
(g(x)− f(x))µ′pn(x)(v · x)
− θ
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
(f(x)− g(x))µ′pn(x)− θ
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
(g(x) − f(x))µ′pn(x) = 0
⇔
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
(f(x)− g(x))µ′pn(x)(w · x− θ) +
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
(g(x) − f(x))µ′pn(x)(v · x− θ) = 0
⇔
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
µ′pn(x)|f(x)− g(x)||w · x− θ|+
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
µ′pn(x)|g(x) − f(x)||v · x− θ|= 0
⇔
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
µ′pn(x)|f(x)− g(x)|(|w · x− θ|+|v · x− θ|) = 0 .
Hence, for any x ∈ {−1, 1}n such that |w ·x−θ|+|v ·x−θ|6= 0 and µ′pn(x) 6= 0, we have that f(x) = g(x).
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
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We are now ready to complete the proof. Given an SVpn-Verification instance a = (a1, . . . , an), θ,
(c1, . . . , cn), we create the following instance of the SVpn-Inverse problem: θ
′ = θ/
∑n
i=1 ai, (c1, . . . , cn).
Then, if the SVpn-Inverse instance is a “NO”-instance, we have a “NO”-instance of the SVpn-Verification
problem. If the SVpn-Inverse output is a weight vector w = (w1, . . . , wn), we can check with a co-NP oracle
if the functions fw,θ′ and fa,θ have the same semivalues: By Lemma 3, they have the same semivalues iff
there is no x ∈ {−1, 1}n such that µ′pn(x) > 0 and fw,θ′(x) 6= fa,θ(x) = f a∑n
i=1
ai
, θ∑n
i=1
ai
(x). This
completes the proof of Theorem 6.
Theorem 1 now follows by combining Theorems 4, 5, and 6.
4 Conclusions
The inverse power index problem has received considerable attention in game theory and social choice,
and the inverse Banzhaf index problem has been relevant in other fields as well, such as circuit complexity
and computational learning. In this paper, we proved that the inverse semivalue problem, for reasonable
probability distributions, is computationally intractable. As special cases, we deduce that the inverse Banzhaf
index and inverse Shapley value problems are also intractable. A number of interesting open questions
remain: Can we design efficient approximation algorithms for the inverse problem in the case of more
general semivalues? Can we characterize the computational complexity of the inverse power index problem
for power indices that do not belong in the semivalues class?
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